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Abstract
Criminals and criminal organizations often make use of companies and other corporate entities to
hide their identity, conceal illicit flows of money, launder funds, finance terrorist organizations, evade
taxes, create and hide slash funds, commit bribery, corruption, accounting frauds and other financial
crimes. These legal entities are frequently organized into complex ownership schemes set up in
different countries, and with a “Chinese boxes” structure, in order to make it harder to determine who
ultimately controls them and benefits of the illegal conduct.
Currently there are a lot of competitors in the market of Financial Fraud Detection but the software
that they propose are mainly oriented to supervise and manage the institutions’ internal compliance
processes such as the management and transmission of Suspicious Activity Reports (SAR) instead of
providing intelligence tools for proactively discovery potential threats and identify the final
beneficiaries of illegal operations. Consequently there is a potential for Financial Fraud Detection
focused on the on-line, real-time statistical analysis of transactions, operators behaviour, price
movements and the use of data mining algorithms that work on heterogeneous sources of big data.
After having described the schemes used for executing the three most relevant financial frauds this
research proposes a novel approach for the detection of illicit behaviours and suspect transactions.
The approach benefits of a multidisciplinary approach for the analysis of the big data streams coming
heterogeneous sources such as TV stream, social media and public (official and unofficial) data bases.
Keywords: financial frauds, big data, business intelligence, real-time analytics.
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1 Introduction to financial frauds and Chinese boxes
The well known Chinese boxes scheme mentioned is common to at least three of the most relevant
crimes related to financial activities:


Market abuse includes the insider trading (average insider purchases are more than $56
million a day, or nearly $1.2 billion a month; average insider sales: more than $600 million a
day, or nearly $13 billion a month – US SEC), the market manipulation that can be deﬁned as
distorting the price-setting mechanism of ﬁnancial instruments (trade-based manipulation) or
as disseminating false or misleading information (information-based manipulation). Such a
‘broad’ understanding of market abuse has been adopted by the legal system of the European
Union. Technological innovations and significant changes to the structure of the European
market landscape have contributed to a rapidly increasing presence of High Frequency
Trading (HFT) that, on one hand, optimally executing certain complex trading strategies but,
on the other hand, presents opportunities for abuse and market manipulation. There are many
market abuse schemes ( i.e. pools, churning, stock bashing, pump and dump, bear ride etc.)
that can be monitored and stylized in order to train the detection engine.



Tax fraud is a huge source of public imbalances: VAT evasion 106 billion + 94 other taxes in
EU 27 (out of 700 billion/year) needed to face the crisis up to 2020). Value Added Tax (VAT)
has a key strength: the government effectively collects a proportion of the tax at each stage in
the sales chain, rather than concentrating the potential revenue, and the risk of evasion, in the
final seller. This “fractionated” nature is also VAT’s principal weakness: many more
transactions have to be logged and reported by traders, raising both the regulatory burden and
the difficulty of monitoring compliance. In addition, the seller of an item is collecting the tax
on behalf of the revenue authority, rather than the revenue authority collecting it directly from
the taxpayer. An example of carousel fraud is shown in the following figure

Figure 1.

VAT carousel fraud - Source: International VAT Association (2007).
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A German missing trader (B) buys goods from a French company (A) without VAT
(destination principle) and sells them at a VAT-inclusive price to (C), without remitting the
tax to the authorities. After several transactions, the same goods are exported to (A) and the
carousel starts again. At each turn, the German broker (E) claims back the input VAT paid
(€180,500). The net loss for the German government is €171,000 (VAT collected by (B) and
not remitted to the authorities). This is the basic scheme but the reality proposes more
complex situations with dozens of players involved.


Money laundering remains a hot topic in the FS sector, where it is almost five times more
likely to occur than in other industries. The report of United Nations Office on Drugs and
Crime (World Bank and UNODC, 2011) estimates that criminal proceeds amounted to 3.6%
of global GDP with up to 2,8 $ trillion being laundered. FS organizations fear the fallout of
being caught up in money laundering – almost 30% believed that the most severe impact is
reputational. The latest statistics available from Eurostat show that in 2010 266.388
Suspicious Activity Reports (SAR)1, 118.559 Unusual Transaction Reports (UTR)2 and
126.116 Suspicious Transaction Reports (STR)3.
In the initial - or placement - stage of money laundering, the launderer introduces his illegal
profits into the financial system. This might be done by breaking up large amounts of cash
into less conspicuous smaller sums that are then deposited directly into a bank account, or by
purchasing a series of monetary instruments (cheques, money orders, etc.) that are then
collected and deposited into accounts at another location.

It is also important to underline that all these frauds are strictly inter-connected since the illegal
profits coming market abuses and tax frauds need to be “laundered” as well as the VAT carousel fraud
is itself a form of money laundering.

2

Current workflow for frauds detection and deficits

2.1

Market abuse schemes

If we refer to market abuse there are three broad groups of detection methods:




Simple detection procedure that deals with raw market data.
Procedures that utilize some statistical market models to forecast the market.
Non-parametric methods and numerical algorithms.

1

Suspicious Activity Report (SAR) is a disclosure made to an FIU by a professional having an obligation to disclose based on any
suspicious activity of money laundering or terrorist financing. The main difference with STR is the fact that the SAR scope is broader as it
may not include a transaction.
2

Unusual transaction report (UTR) is a disclosure made to an FIU by a professional with an obligation to disclose, based on unusual
behaviour in a client's profile. The main distinction between an STR and UTR is the higher standards and quality expected of STRs.
3

Suspicious transaction report (STR) is a disclosure made to an FIU by a party having an obligation to disclose based on any type of
suspicion of money laundering or terrorist financing which are required by regulations, which may include unusual behaviour. Suspicious
transactions are handled to the appropriate law enforcement units for investigation. The counting unit was specified as the initial STR
received for each case opened by the FIU from each category of obliged entity.
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The main disadvantages of these approaches are the need to constantly and precisely calibrate the
algorithm parameters and a potential bias towards ambiguous signals of the system. Numerical
algorithms need to be tested thoroughly before one can judge their effectiveness and put them into
practice. Moreover these methods are based on the market data analysis without exploring the outer
dimension coming from news, blogs, TV, radio and social channels.

2.2

VAT Frauds and money laundering

Feedback is an important technique in improving intelligence and maximising the impact of the effort
that goes into reporting suspicious activity but large financial institutions can generate thousands (and
in some cases, hundreds of thousands) of SARs every year, so AML compliance costs can be
substantial. Many scenarios will generate superfluous or unproductive alerts, that is, alerts where
suspicious activity is anticipated but none is found. More unproductive alerts mean higher compliance
costs. Unstructured data can be a fundamental problem. In some instances, SAR databases are made
up of many thousands of narrative reports containing unstructured data that can be difficult to analyse.
Unstructured data is information presented as text – for example, a written paragraph describing the
nature of the suspicious activity – which is challenging for analytics to parse. As of yet, there is no
easy and reliable way to perform quantitative analysis on the informational components of a written
paragraph. However, augmenting the SARs with descriptive (yet structured) information will help
support the use of analytics and data mining tools.
After having identified the illegal transaction the following action is to identify the Beneficial Owner
and the actual Ownership Structure. The BOWNET project carried out a survey among the EU
competent authorities asking what data/information is used to reconstruct the OS and identify the BO
of suspicious corporate entities

Figure 2.

Data sources currently used for reconstructing the OS and identify the BO of
suspicious corporate entities (source BOWNET project).
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It is consequently not surprising to find that the data sources most frequently used in investigations of
this kind are business registers, which usually provide, among other data, also information on the
shareholders and directors of the legal persons registered. But if most SMEs, after all, are
straightforward structures where the shareholders are the same as the directors and they hold the
shares in their own names for some, particular those that want to obfuscate this information, there are
many opportunities to do so these days – through nominee directors and shareholders, offshore
entities, and complex networks of obscure company structures the rules

Figure 3.

Financial links between VAT carousel and drugs street cash (Source FATF).

For all these frauds becomes fundamental to identify the signals of a suspicious transaction and trace
the connections that may lead to the Beneficial Owner (BO) i.e. the actual responsible of the criminal
offense. The Financial Action Task Force (FATF, 2012) defines Beneficial Owner as: “the natural
person(s) who ultimately owns or controls a customer and/or the natural person on whose behalf a
transaction is being conducted. It also includes those persons who exercise ultimate effective control
over a legal person or arrangement”.
Directive 2005/60/EC (Third AML Directive or 3AMLD), integrated by implementing measures
(Directive 2006/70/EC, see below), which comprises the highest number of provisions regarding BO
identification and the disclosure of information on BOs and Ownership Structure OS. The 3AMLD
addressed gaps highlighted in previous scoping studies and impact assessments, such as Transcrime in
2007 and Howell e Van Reenen in 2005, in particular referring to the lack of regulation requiring
disclosure of full information on BOs. In fact, the directive, drawing on from previous FATF
recommendations and adopting an intermediary-based approach, requires the following categories:
credit institutions, financial institutions, auditors, external accountants and tax advisors, notaries, and
other independent legal professionals, trust or company service providers and real estate agents.
Identifying then the money flow after it enters the financial system is therefore crucial to identifying
the associated money laundering, and Suspicious Transaction Reports (STRs) play a crucial role in
this task. Therefore, whistleblowing mechanisms appear to be more prevalent than before, however
doubts remain over their effectiveness. Indeed, a recent survey of FTMT-GAFI among countries
representatives only 2 (out of 7) EU respondents were able to say how many intelligence reports
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concerning VAT carousel fraud were disseminated to other countries and 25% of respondents failed to
conduct annual fraud risk assessments.

3

Features for a new model of Financial Frauds Detection

Technological innovation, combined with the increase in the number of trading venues, makes it
necessary for the Financial Institutions to use an electronic detection and analysis system to identify
suspicious transactions, Beneficial Owners and Ownerships Structures. This enables to trace certain
types of frauds abuse in a targeted way. In the future, the anti-fraud detection will focus more on the
statistical analysis of transactions, price movements and use the use of algorithms to conduct searches
of reported transactions (data mining) on big data4 rather than use single reports (i.e. SAR) as a
starting point of the analysis. Our system for Finance Frauds Detection (FFD) aims to provide a new
generation of services to better support the identification of the financial frauds in the previously
described areas. The system will offer the financial institutions support for the whole workflow from
the discovery of suspect behaviours to the identification of the Beneficial Owner and the actual
Ownership Structure.

Functions

Parameters

Selection of input channels
from all over the world from public Web Sites e.g. from online In:
newspapers or press agencies, Social Networks, TV channels, Tax
 list of Channels with Type
databases, banking system databases, company registries. They could
select the sources, which are most relevant for the target users, e.g. on
the basis of received input, news agencies or Web access statistics. Details related to channel type:
The end consumers can be located in the region but also at any place
 Web Sites: list of Pages
in the world and are interested in some specific domains
social networks: topics, ...


TV
Streams
Schedule



company registries



market price time series

Identification of stylized facts representing a signal of possible fraud,
such as:
 For market abuse
In:
o a trader places both buy and sell orders at about the

same price
o savvy online message board posters (a.k.a. "Bashers")
who make up false and/or misleading information

stylized frauds, countries,
sectors, persons, events
time
window

According to Gartner’s definition “Big data is high-volume, high-velocity and high-variety information assets that demand
cost-effective, innovative forms of information processing for enhanced insight and decision making.”
4
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o
o



about the target company in an attempt to get shares
for a cheaper price
a group of traders create activity or rumours in order
to drive the price of a security up
selling and repurchasing the same or substantially the
same security for the purpose of generating activity
and increasing the price.



order [relevance, topic,
country,
sector
...]
Out:



alert on potential frauds



Beneficial Owners



Ownership Structure

 network
of
For VAT and money laundering
persons/companies
o Business has changed commodities and sectors
 tendency: % growing /
quickly.
falling
o Turnover of business grows substantially in short time
period
 Zooming in / out for
o Unsolicited approaches from organisations with little
Region
history in the market offering a guaranteed profit on
 Zooming in / out for time
high-value deals.
windows
o Repeat deals at the same or a lower prices and small
or consistent profit, e.g. €1 per item.
o Instructions to pay less than the full price to the
The methods and tools applied
supplier.
are:
o Using goods that are of high value and low volume
 Cross lingual data
and attract a high tax rate such as computer parts or
extraction
mobile phones.
 Multi lingual semantic for
o The total amount of money channelled through an
identification of potential
account is considerable, although the balance is
frauds
usually very low.
o Not publishing the companies’ annual records,
 Supervised/knowledge
pursuing activities that are not part of the corporate
based machine learning
goals.
 Network analysis
o Obligatory elements of invoices, such as VAT
 Visualisation techniques
number, date etc. are missing.
o Foreign nationals in charge of companies, who have
often never been a director of a company in the
jurisdiction and may not have an address in the
jurisdiction.
o Invoices for services not usually associated with the
business.
o Export of goods do not match normal market rate.

Visualization
to get an overview over most important new trends during the last In:
hours or day or highlight specific developments. Users in charge of the

control will utilize the visualization of transactions, BOs and OS from
the observed channels to update and adopt the needed actions

including the association of the sentiment to markets behavior and the

face recognition of the suspects.

Out:
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topics, countries, persons,
time window
type
of
visualization
[diagram,
curbe, table…]
visualization
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variable formats

Exposé generation
to get an ad hoc and intraday report: users can select domains where In: topics, countries,
they want to get information from in order to collect input materials persons
for their own control activity. In-depth list of potential threats which
have to be updated several times per day. Include new sources that
 level of detail
comply with the flexibly ordered digest of different new topics and
support the FFD.
 time window


sectors,

type of materials

Out: links to background materials

Table 1.



type of material



links to big data sources,
aggregated
items
relevance values

Functions and Parameters of the Financial Frauds Detection system.

Input Channels
Input channels are social media (from Twitter to specialized blogs through Facebook), news channels
(text and voice), financial information providers, information gathered by State bodies such as
business registers, tax offices and made available under the Open Data scheme. Indeed, there is
growing trend to make available to a wider public the information because it is essential to give the
greatest publicity to the affairs of companies, which everyone may know on what grounds he is
dealing5. These sources use text, pictures and video in the several languages that are used for business
conversations for finance and trading:
Internet, blogs, social media:
 non-structured sources from Facebook, Twitter.
 Business registers (Open Data)
 Tax databases
 Banking system databases
 News providers
 Financial information providers

Output
Analysis results for FFD system will be shown through a dashboard, which content can be exported to
file reports in PDF format for in-house use. Different aggregates of the information shown in the

5

http://registries.opencorporates.com/
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dashboard could be exported including entities (company names, frauds, locations etc) mentions,
trends related to a given entities and/or concepts appearing along with selected entities.
The output of the FFD services will be delivered according the selected time windows and can be
transferred in-house to another department or forwarded to external customers:
 Reports according the selected topic, sector, companies and individuals

4



Visualizations according the defined parameters and scales



Links to original sources and background material.

Conclusions

We believe that the proposed approach goes beyond the current state of the art (Ngai et al., 2011) by
applying monitoring of social networks, registers and web sources to extract cases of Market abuse,
VAT frauds and Money laundering. Indeed the control chain of Financial Frauds can be only
reconstructed by merging the heterogeneous information from the business registers and other private
business information providers, and by collecting information from open sources such as LEA reports,
the press, social networks.
The electronic detection and analysis to identify suspicious transactions, Beneficial Owners and
Ownerships Structures is not widely exploited to trace certain types of frauds abuse in a targeted way.
There is a potential for an anti-fraud detection which focus more on the statistical analysis of
transactions, price movements and use the use of algorithms to conduct searches of reported
transactions (data mining) on big data rather than use single reports (i.e. SAR) as a starting point of the
analysis. The minor role played by open sources (e.g. news, press archives) is mostly due to problems
of reliability and organisation of the information but also to the fact that almost half of the
respondents (46.7%) did not make use of software (Transcrime, 2013) and IT tools to analyse such
information.
Here comes the role of our FFD system, indeed, if the non-use of software may not necessarily have
consequences in terms of either the effectiveness of investigations or of their outcomes, it surely
implies more time-consuming research or a loss of potential investigative leads. But at the present
stage the business intelligence solutions are only used by a small number of public investigators in
fraud identification activities due mainly to a lack of software able to collect, merge and process
information coming from different sources different from business registers.
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